Angry People in the Sky: Air Rage and the Tokyo Convention by Nase, Vernon & Humphrey, Nicolas
Journal of Air Law and Commerce
Volume 79 | Issue 4 Article 1
2014




Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/jalc
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Air Law and
Commerce by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Vernon Nase et al., Angry People in the Sky: Air Rage and the Tokyo Convention, 79 J. Air L. & Com. 701 (2014)
https://scholar.smu.edu/jalc/vol79/iss4/1






II. THE GLOBAL NATURE OF THE PROBLEM ..... 703
III. RELEVANT JURISPRUDENCE ................. 705
IV. THE ACUTE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM IN
CHINA ................................... 708
A. THE DELAY ISSUE ............................... 710
B. GROWTH OF CHINESE MARKET DEMANDS MORE
AIR SPACE BE ALLOCATED ...................... 711
C. PASSENGER EXPECTATIONS ...................... 712
V. AIR RAGE FROM THE AIRLINES'
PERSPECTIVE .............................. 713
A. INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION
"GUIDANCE" DOCUMENT ........................ 714
B. THE ROLE OF THE AIR CREW ................ 716
VI. THE PERTINENT LAW... ................... 718
VII. PILOT EMPOWERMENT UNDER CHINA'S CIVIL
AVIATION LAW ................................... 721
VIII. CHINA'S AVIATION LAW ......................... 723
IX. THE POSITION UNDER THE AVIATION
LIABILITY CONVENTIONS ................... 726
X. THE DAMAGE PROBLEM UNDER ARTICLE 19. 727
XI. THE EUROPEAN UNION APPROACH TO
DELAY ................................... 727
* Dr. Vernon Nase is an Associate Professor at Curtin Law School in Western
Australia.
** Nicholas Humphrey is a Ph.D Candidate at Curtin University, Senior
Associate at Clyde & Co LLP (Dubai, UAE), and Vice-Chair of RAeS Air Law
Group, Middle East Sub-Committee.
701
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [79
XII. THE MODERNIZATION OF THE TOKYO
CONVENTION ............................. 728
A. BACKGROUND OF THE PROTOCOL TO AMEND THE
CONVENTION ON OFFENSES AND CERTAIN OTHER
ACTS COMMITrED ON BoARD AIRCRAFr (TOKYO
CONVENTION PROTOCOL) ....................... 733
B. THE CONTENT OF THE NEW PROTOCOL ......... .736
C. THE IN-FLIGHT SECURITY OFFICER............... 738
D. THE INTERRELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ARTICLES 6
AND 10 IN THE CONSOLIDATED TEXT ............ 740
E. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE NEW PROTOCOL .... 742
XIII. GENERAL CONCLUDING COMMENTS ......... 744
I. INTRODUCTION
IN ONE OF the final passages of Chinese Emperor Kang-He's
amplified instructions on The Sacred Edict, the Chinese Em-
peror Yoong-Ching wrote in 1724:
[W] hen anger rises in the bosom of a man, he should reflect, "If
I let this anger out, by what means may it afterwards be put a stop
to? Let me not become angry, lest that afterwards, I may not be
able to rescue myself from the consequences, that would be
dreadful indeed."'
In light of the repeated incidents of air rage in China,2 it ap-
pears these prophecies have been lost to an earlier age of re-
straint. More often than not, an angry response or outburst by a
member of the traveling public in response to prolonged flight
delays, missing baggage, poor service, or generally unrealized
expectations in the travel experience has a root cause that is
understandably provocative. Such is the nature of "external re-
sponse air rage." Conversely, there is "internal response air
rage," which is unruly behavior that arises from a psychological
or psychiatric impairment, excessive alcohol consumption,
smoker's withdrawal rage, or just general unsociable behavior.
This "anger in the skies or in the airport" is attendant upon
the rise of the low cost carrier, cost cutting by the "high cost"
carriers, shortcomings in airport infrastructure and air space
management, and inflexible airport curfews. While neither form
of air rage is condoned by legal or social norms, when airline
I EMPEROR KANG-HE, THE SACRED EDICT: CONTAINING SIXTEEN MAXIMS OF THE
EMPEROR KANG-HE 298 (William Milne trans., 1817).
2 See Tom Ballantyne, Chinese Passengers Seeing Red, ORIENT AVIATION, June
2013, at 20.
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staff or members of the public are subjected to threatening
physical or verbal abuse, the root causes behind "external re-
sponse air rage" give rise to consumer protection regulation and
oversight.
This article examines the rise in air rage, with a particular fo-
cus on China and selected common law jurisdictions such as
Australia and the United States, and also the response gener-
ated by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)
Diplomatic Conference (March-April 2014), assessing both the
preexisting needs and the effectiveness of the responses gener-
ated by the Montreal Diplomatic Conference of 2014.
II. THE GLOBAL NATURE OF THE PROBLEM
Problems associated with the unruly and unacceptable behav-
iors that fall loosely under the banner of air rage are widespread
and not confined only to a particular nationality, to a part of the
world, to domestic flights, or to international flights.3 In 2010,
the International Air Transport Association (IATA) reported
that incidents of air rage worldwide rose by 29% between 2009
and 2010.4 Statistics from civil aviation authorities in this area
tend to be elusive and understate the extent of the problem.
IATA figures comparing the years 2007 through 2009 show a
"six-fold increase in air rage cases."5 Tekin Akgeyic reports sig-
nificant increases in the United Kingdom (UK) (up by 28.9%
from 2008 to 2009) and Australia (an increase from sixty-four
incidents in 2007 to 461 incidents in 2009).6 In the 2011-2012
financial year, Australian Federal Police (AFP) "responded to
more than 1000 alcohol-related incidents at [Australia's] [ten]
major airports."7 A 2008 Australian Services Union (ASU) survey
of airport workers in Australia reported that 81% of surveyed








7 Press Release, Australian Fed. Police, Disorderly Passenger Arrested at Bris-
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workers in customer service roles "ha[ve] experienced air rage"
while at work in Australian airports."
In the United States, the causes of air rage in part can be at-
tributed to the behavior of the airlines themselves. For example,
during the global downturn in 2008, American Airlines cut 8%
of its workforce.' Despite an upturn and American Airlines in-
creasing its traffic by 2.7% in the last quarter, it is still employing
11% fewer staff than it did in 2006, and staff are being asked to
do more with less resources.1 0 Cancellations by low cost carriers
due to alleged "technical problems" are really based on num-
bers of passengers down, and the allegations amount to an ex-
cuse to cancel service. 1'
Statistics from the UK prepared by the Civil Aviation Author-
ity and the Department of Transport "revealed that alcohol con-
sumption and smoking were the main factors in nearly 63% of
reported incidents, and 78% of cases involved male passen-
gers."' 2 It is also worth noting that the UK consciously decided
to discontinue its annual report entitled Disruptive Behaviour On
Board UK Aircraft." Even in Japan, where being civil, working
cooperatively, and showing quiet dignity are highly valued, dis-
ruptive passenger behavior "increased 5.4 times between 1997
and 2000."' The growth of air rage incidents is occurring
against the backdrop of unprecedented growth in air transporta-
8 LINDA WHITE, PRODUCTIVIY COMMISSION INQUIRY INTO THE ECONOMIC REGU-
LATION OF AIRPORT SERVICES ISSUES PAPER, JANUARY 2011 6, available at http://
www.pc.gov.au/_data/assets/pdffile/0004/107797/subO26.pdf.




12 Emmanuella Grinberg, Air Rage: Passengers 'Quicker to Snap', CNN (June 1,
2012), http://edition.cnn.com/2012/06/01/travel/air-rage; see also Letter from
Rick Chatfield, Info. Rights & Inquiries Officer, Civil Aviation Auth. (Feb. 7,
2013), available at http://www.caa.co.uk/docs/1357/F001463ReplyLetter.pdf
(where the Civil Aviation Authority has provided information on each incident
reported between 2011 and 2012 through its "mandatory occurrence reporting
scheme" in response to a Freedom of Information Act request).
13 See Disruptive Behaviour on Board UK Aircraft, DATA.GOV.UK, http://data.gov
.uk/dataset/disruptive-behaviour on-board-uk aircraft (last visited Nov. 14,2014).
14 Akgeyik, supra note 5 (citing a survey conducted by the Scheduled Airline
Association of Japan (SAAJ)); see EIKO IKEGAMI, BONDS OF CIVILITY: AESTHETIC
NETWORKS AND THE POLITICAL ORIGINS OF JAPANESE CULTURE 29-30 (2005); see
also Linda Lowen, Why Crisis Hasn't Shaken the Bedrock ofJapan's Culture of Civility,
LINDALOWEN.COM (Mar. 17, 2011), http://lindalowen.com/2011/03/17/why-cri
sis-hasnt-shaken-the-bedrock-of-japans-culture-of-civility.
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tion globally.'" Alejandro Piera observes that the "[a]irline in-
dustry expects 3.3 billion passengers by 2014-an increase of
800 million passengers from the 2.5 billion carried in 2009."16
Piera also notes that IATA figures suggest there has been an
alarming increase in air rage incidents from 2007 to 2009.17
III. RELEVANT JURISPRUDENCE
Any discussion on air rage cannot ignore the causal link be-
tween alcohol use and assaults in the sky. Anglin, Neves, Gies-
brecht, and Kobus-Matthews state that informal estimates
suggest that about 40% of air rage incidents are alcohol-re-
lated.18 In separate articles, Ginger and Karp have set out a
number of cases considered by U.S. courts where the intoxica-
tion of a passenger resulted in unruly or abusive behavior. 19
In O'Carroll v. American Airlines, Inc., "a passenger became
loud, drunk and boisterous during a flight ... [and] the passen-
ger warned the pilot that he would 'help him fly the plane.' 2 0
In Harris v. American Airlines, Inc., "a female passenger of Afri-
can-American descent was subjected to rude, obnoxious, and ra-
cist remarks by an intoxicated white passenger in the first class
cabin," and "despite the white passenger's obvious state of intox-
ication, flight attendants continued to serve him alcohol."2 Von
Hundertmark v. Boston Professional Hockey Ass'n, Inc. involved a
"flight attendant [who was] working on a ... charter flight carry-
ing the Boston Bruins hockey team."2 2 Her blouse was torn open
and she was fondled by a player "while another hockey player
took a photograph of her breasts."2 3 The flight attendant "sued
15 See Alejandro Piera, ICAO's Latest Efforts to Tackle Legal Issues Arising from Un-
ruly/Disruptive Passengers: The Modernization of the Tokyo Convention 1963, 37 AIR &
SPACE L. 231, 232-33 (2012).
16 Id.
17 Id. at 233.
18 Lise Anglin et al., Alcohol-Related Air Rage: From Damage Control to Primary Pre-
vention, 23 J. PRIMARY PREVErTION 283, 288 (2003).
19 See Stephen R. Ginger, Violence in the Skies: The Rights and Liabilities of Air
Carriers when Dealing with Disruptive Passengers, 23 AIR & SPACE L. 106-11 (1998);
Judith R. Karp, Mile High Assaults: Air Carrier Liability under the Warsaw Convention,
66 J. AIR L. & COM. 1551 (2001).
20 Ginger, supra note 19, at 112 (citing O'Carroll v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 863 F.2d
11, 12 (5th Cir. 1989)).
21 Id. (citing Harris v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 55 F.3d 1472, 1473 (9th Cir. 1995)).
22 Id. at 113 (citing Von Hundertmark v. Bos. Prof'1 Hockey Ass'n, Inc., No.
CV-93-1369 (CPS), 1996 WL 118538, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 1996)).
23 Id.
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the Boston Bruins for negligent supervision of its players in per-
mitting them to become intoxicated on an aircraft."24
Gee v. Southwest Airlines involved an Asian-American passenger
who sued "Southwest Airlines for continuing to serve alcohol to
a noisy wedding party that harassed her with racial slurs and
'pantomimed cocking and shooting a gun at Gee and her com-
'"125panions ....
Langadinos v. American Airlines involved a passenger who "al-
legedly suffered injuries . . . when airline personnel continued
to serve alcohol to an intoxicated . . passenger who subse-
quently assaulted the passenger."'2 In Tsevas v. Delta Air Lines,
Inc., a passenger "sued the airlines after she was physically and
verbally assaulted by an intoxicated male passenger who was
seated next to her."27 Stone v. Continental Airlines involved an in-
toxicated passenger punching another passenger in the face.2 1
On this air rage issue, the IATA has suggested that "[t]he
company may consider having a written policy that supports all
employees in the enforcement of their specific Alcohol Policy.
Some IATA Member airlines require Cabin Crew to attain Re-
sponsible Service of Alcohol (RSA) statements upon hiring (Austra-
lia) ."2 IATA's suggestive approach is very limiting and should
go further, but this remains part of a theme consistent with the
view of Anglin et al. that the airline industry should have the
powers and policies to punish the unruly and intoxicated pas-
senger as opposed to curtailing the passengers from becoming
intoxicated in the first place."0 Karp suggests that the airlines
need to do more:
To avoid liability for violent passenger behavior, air carriers must
be proactive rather than reactive. Airlines must adopt a "zero tol-
erance" policy for assaults. Airlines should . . . implement new
policies and procedures for identifying and responding to poten-
24 Id.
25 Id. at 114 (citing Gee v. Sw. Airlines, 110 F.3d 1400, 1403 (9th Cir. 1997)).
26 Karp, supra note 19, at 1563 (citing Langadinos v. Am. Airlines, 199 F.3d 68,
69 (1st Cir. 2000)).
27 Id. at 1562 (citing Tsevas v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., No. 97C0320, 1997 WL
767278, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 1, 1997)).
28 See id. at 1560 (citing Stone v. Cont'l Airlines, 905 F. Supp. 823, 824 (D. Haw.
1995)).
29 GUIDANCE ON UNRULY PASSENGER PREVENTION AND MANAGEMENT 17 (1st ed.
2012) [hereinafter IATA GUIDANCE DOCUMENT], available at http://www.iata
.org/policy/Documents/2013-V1-PUBLIC-Guidance-on-Unruly-passenger-preven
tion-and-management.pdf.
30 Anglin et al., supra note 18, at 292-93.
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tially disruptive passengers. Air carriers should curtail alcoholic
beverage service to intoxicated passengers and limit alcoholic
beverage service during delay periods. The courts have sent a
clear message that serving alcohol is a sufficient link in the causal
chain of responsibility for an Article 17 "accident.""
Likewise, Ginger considers that it is in the carriers' own interests
to minimize liability: "Nevertheless, if an air carrier takes steps to
establish reasonable procedures in dealing with unruly passen-
gers, it will have an important safeguard against liability in the
courts for disruptive passenger actions."32
One of the dangers the carriers encounter when taking af-
firmative action against such passengers is the potential of re-
ceiving frivolous passenger claims where the "aggrieved"
passenger alleges that they were somehow being discriminated
against for being denied adequate alcohol services." For exam-
ple, in McAuley v. Aer Lingus Ltd., the airline refused a passen-
ger's request for four minature bottles of wine at the start of a
flight because the airline's policy was to serve only two drinks on
the flight, which flew from Dublin, Ireland to Vilnius, Lithua-
nia.3 Allegedly, the passenger was intoxicated and verbally
abused the flight attendants.3 5 The airline's pilot "contacted the
Lithuanian police and two . . . officers escorted the [passenger]
from the aircraft."3 6 The passenger filed an action for damages
for slander and libel, malicious and/or negligent misstatement,
injurious falsehood, mental suffering, and breach of the plain-
tiffs constitutional rights." While the action was ultimately dis-
missed because the events giving rise to the claim were governed
by Article 17 of the Montreal Convention, the case demonstrates
the emotive position occasionally taken by passengers.3 8
Based upon their research, Anglin et al. believe the primary
prevention of air rage caused by alcohol is achievable and that
the three areas for improvement in law, regulation and policy
are: (1) liquor licensing and controls at airports; (2) legislation
on alcohol consumption, promotion, sales, and service on air-
lines; and (3) research on effective alcohol policies for the air
31 Karp, supra note 19, at 1568.
32 Ginger, supra note 19, at 117.
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travel industry. 9 In the late 1990s and early 2000s, the United
States, Canada, Japan, Norway, Switzerland, and the United
Kingdom all took proactive steps-some more successful than
others-in attempts to curb air rage caused by alcohol use.40 In
2009, the Australian carrier Qantas unilaterally introduced a
policy to ban full-strength spirits and beer on flights serving
mining areas in Western Australia." A spokesman for Qantas
noted that mining corporations and the Flight Attendants Asso-
ciation were fully supportive of this step.
IV. THE ACUTE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM IN CHINA
China has been described by one commentator as "a nation
beset by chronic delays and a rapidly expanding air travel indus-
try [in which air rage] incidents have become common."4 3
While the number of passengers continues to grow, the number
of security staff has remained the same as ten years ago.44 The
frequency of delays in the departure of aircraft appears to have
(1) fueled the fires of passenger anger; (2) created reluctance
on the part of security staff to exercise control over disruptive
passengers; and (3) engendered passivity on the part of board-
ing staff.45
In several incidents, such as the notorious temper tantrum of
the Chinese mining executive Yan Linkun, security staff did not
act to restrain or remove offending passengers. In the You-
Tube recording of his destructive rampage, three individuals
who appear to be security officials gather nearby but do not at-
tempt to restrain or pacify Linkun.o Some commentators have
suggested that the imperative within Chinese culture to main-
tain a harmonious society explains the reluctance of parties to
3 See Anglin et al., supra note 18, at 292.
40 Id.
41 See Drunk Miners Force Full Strength Beer, Spirits Off Qantas, WA TODAY (Oct. 30,
2009, 1:27 PM), http://www.watoday.com.au/wa-news/drunk-miners-force-full-
strength-beer-spirits-off-qantas-20091030-hpf3.html.
42 Id.
4 Anthony Dennis & Nathan Oliveri, Alarm as Chinese Airport Aggro Flares, THE-




46 See Ballantyne, supra note 2, at 20.
47 See Patrick Scally, Official Suspended After Epic Kunming Airport Tantrum,
GoKUNMING (Feb. 25, 2013), http://www.gokunming.com/cn/blog/item/2913/
official-suspended-after-epic-kunming-airport-tantrum.
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directly address incidents involving offensive behavior.4 8
Linkun's subsequent stage-managed apology arguably suggests a
conservative approach to subjecting individuals of a certain sta-
tus to the normal laws of the land.4 9 This incident apart, the air
rage problems that have emerged in China mainly relate to how
China manages its domestic air market and how air space is allo-
cated in that country.5 0
Incidents of air rage in China often occur in and around the
Chinese New Year." The new Kunming Changshui Interna-
tional Airport in the Yunnan Province of southwest China ap-
pears to have been a flashpoint for incidents of air rage. 2 In
January 2013, there were hundreds of flight cancellations that
stranded many passengers. 3 In one incident, airport police
were proactive in using pepper spray to subdue unruly passen-
gers in the terminal who tried to break through a security gate."
News reports suggest that delayed passengers at Kunming Air-
port in January 2013 were responsible for assaults of forty em-
ployees, five smashed computers, fifteen damaged walkie-talkies,
and twenty-one wireless cards thefts.
In response to a rash of recent, sometimes-bizarre incidents at
Chinese airports, journalists have coined the term Chinese "ter-
minal tantrums."5 Ballantyne notes that incidents of air rage
have become so common in flight and at Chinese airports that
the expression "kong nu zu" or "air rage tribe" has been
coined.
48 Ballantyne, supra note 2, at 20.
49 Linkun was a member of the Communist Party political advisory body in
Yunnan, as well as the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference. See
Scally, supra note 47.
50 See Ballantyne, supra note 2, at 21.
51 See id. at 22 (describing incidents occurring during the 2013 New Year in-
cluding: (1) the Yan Lingun incident alluded to in the text above; (2) an incident
at Beijing Airport where six business class passengers declined to fasten seatbelts
and turn off mobile phones resulting in a return of the aircraft to the gate; and
(3) an incident where two Chinese passengers on an Air France flight stole be-
tween seven and sixteen bottles of wine from a refreshment cart and then
threatened another passenger who objected).
52 See Scally, supra note 47.
53 Id.
54 See Scally, supra note 47.
55 Panda Walking, A Deep Look into Chinese-Style Air Rage, CHINA 15' (Jan. 31,
2013), http://chinal5min.com/2013/01/31/a-deep-look-into-chinese-style-air-
rage-2/ (last visited Nov. 14, 2014).
56 See, e.g., Dennis & Oliveri, supra note 43.
57 Ballantyne, supra note 2.
709
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
A. THE DELAY ISSUE
Frustration, engendered by excessive delays, has sparked inci-
dents such as those described above. The sad reality is that the
frequent and lengthy delays experienced in China are systemic.
Traditionally, the military controls airspace in China and only
narrow corridors, which represent 20% of Chinese airspace, are
available for use by commercial aircraft." It is appropriate to
acknowledge that not all air rage issues in China are due to fre-
quent delays, as alluded to above.
Two incidents at Shanghai Pudong Airport that were both in
reaction to significant flight delays gained international notori-
ety. In April 2012, the first incident occurred after a sixteen-
hour delay to a flight, when twenty disgruntled passengers
stormed the airport's runway. Although they came within 200
meters of a jet arriving from the United Arab Emirates, each
passenger was subsequently provided with compensation. Each
passenger received 1,000 yuan, which is equivalent to about
$162 U.S. dollars, in compensation."
In July 2012, the second incident involved U.S. carrier United
Airlines, which cancelled a flight from Shanghai to Newark, New
Jersey, three times over a four-day period, from Wednesday to
Saturday. 0
When the passengers finally were led to the other plane they
took their seats only to find out that flight crew had also been on
duty for too many hours, leading to another cancellation. While
some furious passengers refused to leave their seats, their lug-
gage was dumped off the carousels outside of the plane . . . ."
The unceremonious dumping of their luggage was the last straw
for at least one of the passengers who rushed at the pilots. 62 This
passenger was restrained." This incident, being associated with
international carriage by air and coming under the Montreal
58 Kazunori Takada, With Flight Delays in China, a Rise in Air Rage, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 11, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/12/business/global/with-
flight-delays-in-china-a-rise-in-air-rage.html.
5 Ballantyne, supra note 2.
60 Jeff Stone, Airline Passengers Revolt After Three-Day Delay in China, INT'L Bus.
TIMES (July 16, 2012), http://www.ibtimes.com/airline-passengers-revolt-after-
three-day-delay-china-723640.
6 Id.
62 Rachel Quigley, Angry Scenes as United Airlines Passengers Stage Revolt After Get-
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Convention, raises issues regarding the proper role of compen-
sation to passengers under Article 19 of the Montreal Conven-
tion and regulating the proper role carriers have in the
prevailing circumstances. The airline belatedly compensated
passengers for this exceptional delay by providing a full refund
and offering them $1,000 vouchers discounting a future flight
with the carrier.6 4 This did not occur until the delayed flight
arrived in the United States at Newark, New Jersey."
A further incident serves to highlight issues associated with
delays in China. At Hainan's Sanya Airport, in March 2013, a
Hong Kong Airlines flight was grounded for six hours.6 6 After
four hours, an elderly man rushed into the first class cabin and
physically attacked and verbally abused a female flight attend-
ant.6" Fellow passengers appeared to endorse the behaviour be-
cause they cheered while this happened."
B. GROWTH OF CHINESE MARKET DEMANDS MORE
AIR SPACE BE ALLOCATED
In 2011, 270 million passengers flew on domestic routes in
China." The IATA predicts around 379 million passengers will
be flying in China by 2014.70 Large numbers of passenger move-
ments, as well as the continual opening up of air flight to more
and more of the population, are occurring against a backdrop
of unrealistic passenger expectations about the service they will
receive for their yuan.7' This is exacerbated by long delays,
which are engendered by a system that is dependent upon mili-
tary decision-making over air space allocation. The solution to
this problem lies in increasing the allocation of air space to civil
aviation in China. Thus, for China, the military is a key player
because military or strategic considerations outweigh civil avia-
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Kate Whitehead, Cheers as Passenger Attack Air Crew, SOUTH CHINA MORNING








73 See Ballantyne, supra note 2, at 21.
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tion needs.74 Equally, other interests involved include govern-
ment, aviation regulators, passengers, pilots, air crew, airport
staff, and civil society.75
C. PASSENGER EXPECTATIONS
The focus of study in this area tends to be fixed quite strongly
on passengers as the perpetrators of the "rage"-aberrant, an-
gry, or violent behavior. At the same time, it should be acknowl-
edged that a carrier's decisions about seating, food, level of
service, and quality of service impact passengers, sometimes
placing significant expectations upon passengers' coping skills.
For example, passengers are currently expected to cope with
computerized systems, including "e-ticketing" and obtaining
baggage checks from automated systems with minimal or no
help.7 6 They are also variously expected to accept cramped seat-
ing, remain buckled up for long periods, remain deferential to
the airline's staff, stay calm in all circumstances, stay unaffected
by a fear of flying or any other medical condition, and endure
poor quality air when pilots turn off air packs to extend the fuel
economy.77
It appears that some airlines have also been restructured in a
way that makes it difficult for passengers to lodge complaints.
A Time magazine report from 2009,suggests that with one U.S.
airline, the only way for a passenger to log a complaint is
through a website that allows the passenger to send an email
detailing the complaint.79 Placing a low value on customer ser-
vice results in higher levels of passenger dissatisfaction.o
In the past, television advertising of airlines focused heavily
on creating expectations of high quality service, sometimes with
relatively little or no differentiation between the first class and
74 Anthony Kuhn, Flight Delays in China Leave Travelers Feeling Squeezed, NPR
(July 31, 2014, 2:14 PM), http://www.npr.org/blog/thetwo-way/2014/07/31/
336869797 /flight-delays-in-china-leave-travelers-feeling-squeezed.





79 Richard Zoglin, The Airlines' Customer-Complaint Lines: No Answer, TIME
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economy experience." While some airlines are addressing the
need to reshape advertisements in such a way to avoid engender-
ing unrealistic expectations by focusing on different aspects
other than service, the traditional approach emphasizing service
on board the aircraft persists. For example, in a recent advertise-
ment, Chinese Airlines emphasized a high level of service with
beautiful female flight attendants smiling and bowing to custom-
ers while providing quality service in a calm environment. 82 Chi-
nese Airlines also has a first class flight advertisement that
features high-quality food being served, personal attendance to
a child, and the close attention from a beautiful female flight
attendant." Such advertisements tend to raise passenger expec-
tations, which may lead to disappointment and anger when the
reality does not match the image.
V. AIR RAGE FROM THE AIRLINES' PERSPECTIVE
As already indicated, the financial imperative has caused
many air carriers to reduce the quantity and quality of service
provided. In a context where carriers fly a large number of pas-
sengers, it is a truism that they operate with very low profit mar-
gins. This makes carriers acutely vulnerable to changes in
market circumstances.8 4 Heavy competition in a deregulated en-
vironment, as in the U.S. domestic marketplace, has forced air-
lines to "adopt a variety of cost-saving measures."8 5
Katrina Hunt argues that because of the potential of air rage
instances creating a negative perception of the airline, there is a
tendency among some airlines to not report instances of air
rage. 6 Brown, quoting Thomas, asserts that the airlines' un-
81 See, e.g., Vintage Airline Commercials Remember When? (VIDEOS), HUFFINCTON
PosT (Feb. 12, 2013, 5:19 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/10/22/
vintage-airline-commercials n_1987830.html.
82 See Bobbyleeproductions, China Airlines - "Customer Service" Ad Remix (2011),
YouTUBE (Jan. 21, 2011), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TORrGMjVXOY.
83 See Bobbyleeproductions, China Airlines - "First Flight" Ad Remix (2011) You-
TUBE (Jan. 21, 2011), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UwdwnQ0_KY.
84 See Richard Posner, Why is Airline Service So Bad?, BECKER-POSNER BLOC (Apr.
21, 2008, 8:59 PM), http://www.becker-posner-blog.com/2008/04/why-is-airline-
service-so-bad-posner.html.
85 Id.
86 Katrina Brown Hunt, The 24 Worst Celebrity Air Rage Incidents, Bus. INSIDER
(Jan. 23, 2013 6:07 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/worst-celebrity-air-
rage-incidents-2012-12 ("'The airlines' unstated policy ... is to get this passenger
the hell out of here-and then let it go."').
713
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
stated policy with the vast majority of incidents is to off-load pas-
sengers and not report the incident. 7
Significant financial pressures caused a reduction in service
levels, especially in the case of the traditional, main carriers."
However, air carriers also feel the burden of protecting their
staff from verbal abuse and attacks by irate, drunken, drugged,
or mentally unstable passengers.8 ' The dichotomy the air carri-
ers face is that, on one hand, they do not want to lose any
reputational advantages they have in the marketplace, but on
the other hand, they want the problem of air rage to diminish.9 0
Some of their concerns are met by the submissions or represen-
tations of carrier organizations, such as the IATA."
A. INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION
"GUIDANCE" DOCUMENT
IATA's Guidance on Unruly Passenger Prevention and Man-
agement (IATA Guidance Document), which was first published
in December 2012, gathers key existing documents produced by
IATA and ICAO, and in so doing, attempts to provide a higher
level of guidance for airlines." Building on the definition of a
disruptive passenger in Annex 17 of the Convention on Interna-
tional Civil Aviation (Chicago Convention), the IATA Guidance
Document presents a non-exhaustive list of "unruly/disruptive"
behaviors on board an aircraft.93 While not prescriptive in its
87 Id.
88 THE IMPACT OF Low COST CARRIERS IN EUROPE 2 (2003), available at http://
www.icao.int/sustainability/CaseStudies/StatesReplies/EuropeLowCostEn.pdf.
89 IATA GUIDANCE DOCUMENT, supra note 29, at 6.
90 See id.
91 IATA's 240 member airlines represent 84% of total world air traffic. See Tony
Tyler, Turbulent Times - Commentay, in THE HINDU ANNUAL SURVEY OF INDIAN
INDUSTRY (2012), available at http://www.iata.org/pressroom/Documents/oped-
turbulent-times-april2012.pdf.
92 See IATA GUIDANCE DOCUMENT, supra note 29, at 3.
93 The unruly/disruptive behaviors outlined include: (1) illegal consumption
of narcotics; refusal to comply with safety instructions (examples include not fol-
lowing cabin crew requests, e.g., instructions to fasten a seat belt, not smoke, turn
off a portable electronic device, or disrupting the safety announcements); (2)
verbal confrontation with crew members or other passengers; (3) physical con-
frontation with crew members or other passengers; (4) uncooperative behavior
(examples include interfering with the crew's duties and refusing to follow in-
structions to board or leave the aircraft); (5) making threats (includes all types of
threats, whether directed against a person, e.g., a threat to injure someone, or
intended to cause confusion and chaos, such as statements referring to a bomb
threat, or simply any threatening behavior that could affect the safety of the crew,
passengers, and aircraft); (6) sexual abuse/harassment; and (7) other type of
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approach, the document emphasizes the need for airlines to de-
velop coherent policies and procedures. The IATA Guidance
Document suggests that such a policy may address issues of
preventing air rage, training and periodic training, handling
problematic passengers, categorizing incidents, pilot-in-com-
mand responsibilities, prosecution, and communication." It
also envisages the possibility of airlines adopting a "zero toler-
ance" policy. 6
The IATA Guidance Document serves as an indirect acknowl-
edgement that the disruptive passenger is not singularly respon-
sible for an air rage incident. For example, with respect to
possible external response air rage incidents caused by delays,
IATA suggests that "[i]nternally the airline may consider . . .
[e]nsuring a smooth operation ... [by] diffusing the frustration
that occurs over long waiting lines, the flight being overbooked,
delays, lack of information, [and] technical deficiencies."9 Not-
withstanding this comment by IATA, it is apparent that it is pri-
marily focused on managing the reacting passenger as opposed
to what the passenger may be reacting to. It may be the case that
IATA is taking a cautious approach and setting out robust gui-
dance on managing delay, in view of its opposition to the Euro-
pean Union's Regulation (EC) No. 261/2004.8 In so doing, it
arguably seeks to avoid the suggestion that carriers, through
their actions, are contributing to the occurrence of air rage. EC
Regulation 261/2004 is a regulation "establishing common rules
on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of
denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights."9
In 2010, the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT)
adopted rules to protect passengers in the event of tarmac de-
lays, titled "Enhancing Airline Passenger Protections," which be-
came effective on April 29, 2010.100 The European Union,
through EC Regulation 261/2004, also introduced in 2010 con-
riotous behavior (examples include screaming, annoying behavior, kicking, and
banging heads on seat backs/tray tables). See id. at 9-10.
94 See id. at 3.
95 See id. at 15.
96 See id. at 14.
97 Id. at 19.
98 Regulation 261/2004, 2004 O.J. (L 046) (EC).
99 Id.
100 See 14 C.F.R. § 259 (2014).
715
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
sumer protection measures to penalize carriers for delays.101
There is no such delay-specific legislation in Australia.10 2
B. THE ROLE OF THE AIR CREW
Cabin crews are often affected by incidents of air rage occur-
ring in flight. As Michaelides observes, "l[c] abin crew and pilots
are increasingly being pushed, punched, bitten, grabbed,
scratched, sworn at, and in one case, even stabbed, by increas-
ingly aggressive passengers."10 At the same time, airline staff are
the victims of airline policy when it comes to cost cutting.104
Their working conditions evaporate as they are asked to do
more with less.' 0
In the post-9/11 era, the industry has responded to the need
for training by providing more staff training related to dealing
with unlawful interferences. 0 6 In some states, aviation operators
now provide appropriate staff training to deal with physical
threats that may occur in the context of terrorist activity or inci-
dents of air rage.'07 This can be done under the umbrella of
Annex 17 of the Chicago Convention, which provides in Section
3.3.1 that "[e]ach [c]ontracting [s]tate shall require operators
providing service from that [s] tate to establish and implement a
written operator security programme appropriate to meet the
requirements of the national civil aviation security programme
of that [s]tate." 0 8 In Australia, this requirement is elaborated
10 Regulation 261/2014, art. 16, 2004 O.J. (L 046).
102 See Flight Delays and Cancellations Air Passenger Rights for Australian Domestic
Flights, GLOBAL TRAVEL MEDIA (Sept. 4, 2013), http://www.eglobaltravelmedia
.com.au/flight-delays-and-cancellations-air-passenger-rights-for-australian-domes
tic-flights.
103 Sofia Michaelides, Unruly Passenger Behaviour and the Tokyo Convention, 6
COVENTRY L.J. 38 (2001).
104 Francine Parnes, For Flight Attendants, Stress Comes With the Job, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 12, 2003), http://www.nytimes.com/2003/08/12/business/business-travel-
for-flight-attendants-stress-comes-with-the-job.html.
105 Id.
106 See, e.g., AIR LINE PILOTS Ass'N, INT'L, AVIATION SECURITY: 10 YEARS ArrER
THE 9/11 ATTACKS 2, available at http://www.alpa.org/portals/alpa/pressroom/
inthecockpit/alpaissueanalysis 10yearsafter9-1 lattacks.pdf.
107 See, e.g., Alison Griswold, Should 'Knee Defender'Fights and Drunk Women Really
Divert Airplanes?, NAT'L POST (Sept. 4, 2014, 2:00 PM), http://news.nationalpost
.com/2014 /0 9 /0 4 /should-knee-defender-fights-and-drunk-women-really-divert-
airplanes.
108 Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180, 15
U.N.T.S. 295, Annex 17, Security: Safeguarding International Civil Aviation Against
Acts of Unlawful Interference, § 3.3.1 (14th ed. 2014).
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and imposed as an obligation on operators in Sections 13 and
14 of the Aviation Transport Security Act 2004.10"
Harry Kern suggests that there is a lack of training of both
airline personnel and the flying public, which contributes, in a
causal sense, to the occurrence of air rage." 0 He argues that
"[t]he lack of training of airline personnel may impede their
ability not only to diffuse potentially disruptive or dangerous sit-
uations involving passengers but also to recognize, before board-
ing, passengers who could pose a threat."'11 Arguably, this view
is no longer wholly accurate as many airlines in the post-9/11
era have developed programs for self-defense and for dealing
with terrorist threats.
A recent press report from Hong Kong shows that the Hong
Kong Airlines' staff received training in basic self-defense tech-
niques in Wing Chun martial arts since 2011.112 However, the
problem persists for the airline as the same press report noted
that this airline experiences three incidents of disruptive passen-
gers per week."'
At times, the capricious behavior of an air crew has played a
causal role in arguably unnecessary diversions, such as in Eid v.
Alaska Airlines."4 Equally, the public meltdown of JetBlue flight
attendant Steven Slater suggests there is a pressure cooker envi-
ronment on board aircraft." 5 Slater, after arguing with a passen-
ger who refused to remain seated after landing, activated an
emergency slide and used it to exit the aircraft.1 16
Air rage is distinct from terrorist activity and is not per se a
national security issue, but because it relates to law and order on
the plane and the safety of civil aviation, the line between the
two phenomena, particularly in the post-9/11 period, has be-
come quite blurred at times.
109 Aviation Transport Security Act 2004 (Cth) ss 13-14 (Austl.).
110 Harry Kern, The Faces of Air Rage, FBI L. ENFORCEMENT BULL., Aug. 9, 2003,
at 7, available at http://1eb.fbi.gov/2003-pdfs/leb-august-2003.
1I Id.
112 See Whitehead, supra note 64.
113 See id.
114 Eid v. Alaska Airlines, 621 F. 3d 858, 864 (9th Cir. 2010).
115 See Scott Mayerowitz, Steven Slater, JetBlue Flight Attendant Out on Bail, ABC
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VI. THE PERTINENT LAW
In 1997, ICAO established a Secretariat Study Group to ex-
amine the rapid increase in reported unruly and disruptive pas-
senger behavior."'7 Over time, the Study Group developed
model legislation on certain offenses committed on board civil
aircraft to be incorporated by ICAO member states into the na-
tional legislation, and in 2002, ICAO published the ICAO Gui-
dance Material on the Legal Aspects of Unruly/Disruptive
Passengers (Circular 288/2002), which included the model leg-
islation. 1 According to Piera, at the time that Circular 288 was
being studied, only the United Kingdom, Australia, the United
States, and Canada had domestic legislation to extend jurisdic-
tion to fill the jurisdictional gap under the Convention on Of-
fences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft
(Tokyo Convention)."'
In the United States, verbal and physical threats, intimidation,
and assault of a crewmember are felonies.1 2 0 In Australia, the
Crimes (Aviation) Act 1991 has been decisive in a number of
cases, including Donovan v Wilkinsonl21 and Lilico v Meyers.1 22 The
Donovan case involved a flight from Singapore to Brisbane that
diverted to Darwin to offload a disruptive passenger.'2 3 The of-
fending passenger's "[behavior], which continued over a sub-
stantial period of time, [made] other passengers on the aircraft
concerned for their safety." 24 "Eventually, the pilot of the air-
craft approached the passenger and told him that, if he did not
modify his behaviour, the aircraft would [divert] to Darwin and
he would be put off there.""12 After initially appearing to calm
down, the passenger "became extremely loud and aggressive
and said to the pilot 'I'll take youse [sic] on.'""2 The passenger
was held to be in breach of Section 15(1) (b) (ii) of the Crimes
(Aviation) Act 1991.127 The Court required the offending pas-
117 See Piera, supra note 13, at 240.
118 See IATA GUIDANCE DOCUMENT, supra note 27, at app. G.
119 See Piera, supra note 13, at 242.
120 FAA Air Traffic and General Operating Rules, 14 C.F.R. § 91.11 (2014).
121 Donovan v Wilkinson [2005] NTSC 8 (Austi.).
122 Lilico v Meyers [2003] QCA 16 (Austl.).
123 Donovan, [2005] NTSC 8, [5]-[6].
124 Id. at [5].
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 Id. at [1].
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senger to reimburse Singapore Airlines the cost of the diversion,
and the decision was affirmed on appeal.12 8
The Lilico case involved an oral threat by a passenger who said
he intended to pull a knife out and highjack the plane.1 29 This
was held to be contrary to Section 24(2) (b) of the Crimes (Avia-
tion) Act 1991.130 Interestingly, the court noted the broad reach
of the Act in creating a range of offenses."'3 These include hi-
jacking, acting violently toward crew members or passengers,
prejudicing the safe operation of the aircraft or endangering its
safety, carrying dangerous goods, making threats, acting vio-
lently at airports, and making false statements that infer an in-
tention to cause damage to the aerodrome.
In Lilico v Meyers, the court noted that the Civil Aviation Regu-
lations 1988 also created two offenses of relevance to the pro-
ceedings: Regulation 256 (boarding an aircraft while
intoxicated) and Regulation 256AA (offensive and disorderly
behaviour on an aircraft). The court imposed a short, custo-
dial sentence based on the circumstances of the case. 3 4 The
judgment provides a useful analysis of previous decisions in this
jurisdiction relating to passenger misconduct on aircraft. 1 3 The
justice observed that:
Other than by the courts imprisoning offenders such as Mr.
Lilico, the airlines could eradicate the problems caused by intoxi-
cated passengers by refusing to allow the intoxicated to board
any aircraft. Likewise, the airlines could stop serving alcohol to
passengers, just as cigarette smoking has been stopped; or serve a
limited quantity per passenger.' 3 6
128 Id. at [9], [36].
129 See Lilico v Meyers [2003] QCA 16, [5] (Austl.).
13o Id. at [1].
131 See id. at [21].
132 See id. (citing the Crimes (Aviation) Act 1991 (Cth) ss 13, 14, 19, 21, 22,23, 24,
26, 28(2) (b) (Hijacking-life imprisonment; Act of Violence towards crew or pas-
sengers-fourteen years imprisonment; Prejudice of safe operation of aircraft-
fourteen years imprisonment; Assault crew-fourteen years imprisonment; En-
danger safety of aircraft-seven years imprisonment; Carry dangerous goods [in-
cludes any weapon] onto aircraft-seven years imprisonment; Threats or false
statements endangering safety of aircraft-two years imprisonment; Violence at
Airports-fifteen years imprisonment; and False Statement reasonably inferring
intent to cause damage to aerodrome)).
"3 See id. at [22].
134 Id. at [32].
135 See id. at [38].
136 Id. at [49].
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Despite the various hotchpotches of national laws that the
parties to the Tokyo Convention have in place, there is still no
uniformity in the approach adopted, and the majority of mem-
ber states have not implemented ICAO Circular 288.137 Circular
288's purpose was to lay out model laws to deal with issues that
may be adopted or legislated at the national level.13 8 Subse-
quently, at its 33rd Session, the ICAO Assembly adopted Resolu-
tion A33-4, calling on member states to pass national laws based
on the Circular 288 Model laws."s' Piera suggests that one way to
modernize the Tokyo Convention is to include Circular 288 into
the terms of the Tokyo Convention so that Circular 288 is more
than just "guidance materials."140
In this context, it is worth noting that the Circular, as a model
law, lays down three types of offenses.14 1 The first is "Assault and
Other Acts of Interference against a Crew Member on Board a
Civil Aircraft," which includes behaviors "such as assault, threat
and intimidation of crew, [and] refusal to follow instruc-
tions."14 2 A second offense is "Assault and Other Acts Endanger-
ing Safety or Jeopardizing Good Order and Discipline on Board
Civil Aircraft," which includes "assault or intimidation of [other]
passengers, damage or destruction of property, [and] consum-
ing alcoholic beverages or drugs resulting in intoxication."'*4 A
third type of offense defined in Circular 288 is "Other Offences
Committed on Board a Civil Aircraft," and this category includes
behaviors such as "smoking in [the] lavatory, tampering with a
smoke detector, or operating an EPD."'4 4 If states were to have
recourse to Circular 288 or similar model law and were able to
resist the temptation to undertake a rewriting exercise, as too
frequently occurs (especially in the case of China), the result
would be more uniform laws throughout all jurisdictions.
137 Piera, supra note 13, at 244.
138 See id. at 240-41.
13 Id. at 240.
140 See id. at 244.
141 See Int'l Civ. Aviation Org. [ICAO], Report of Special Sub-Committee of the Legal
Committee for the Modernization of the Tokyo Convention Including the Issue of Unruly
Passengers, at A4-18, ICAO Doc. LC/SC-MOT (May 22-25, 2012).
142 Id.
143 Id.
144 EPD refers to an electronic portable device. Id.
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VII. PILOT EMPOWERMENT UNDER CHINA'S
CIVIL AVIATION LAW
Consonant with the Chicago Convention and its Annexes and
the Tokyo Convention, under the Civil Aviation Law of the Peo-
ple's Republic of China (Chinese Civil Aviation Law), the pilot-
in-command is extended a suite of powers to deal with incidents
occurring on board the aircraft. 1 4 5 The pilot-in-command is em-
powered by Article 46 of the Chinese Civil Aviation Law to take
measures to deal with incidents of air rage. 1 4 6 Article 46 provides
that:
The pilot-in-command has the right to take necessary and appro-
priate measures in flight, under the prerequisite of ensuring
flight safety, against any acts which may destroy ... interfere with
the order on board and jeopardize the safety . . .. In case of
extraordinary circumstances in flight, the pilot-in-command shall
have authority as to disposition of the civil aircraft so as to ensure
the safety of the aircraft and the persons therein. 4 7
While this provision is consonant with the Tokyo Conven-
tion's Article 6, it lacks the specificity of Article 6(2), which per-
mits the commander to require or authorize the assistance of
other crew members and passengers." Article 48 of the Chi-
nese Civil Aviation Law, in expressing the right of the com-
mander to authorize crew and passengers to act, appears to have
limited this to situations of distress and arguably, may be read
quite narrowly because of the general words used in its construc-
tion.1 4 9 For example, it lacks the clarity of Article 6(2) of the
Tokyo Convention, which categorically authorizes restraint of
offending individuals.15 0 The Chinese Civil Aviation Law prefers
the "all necessary measures" formula from the Warsaw Conven-
tion over the "reasonable grounds" and "reasonable preventive
measures" used in the Tokyo Convention.' 5
145 See Civil Aviation Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's
Cong., Oct. 30, 1995, effective Mar. 1, 1996) (China).
146 See id. art. 46.
147 Id.
148 Compare id., with Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Commit-
ted On Board Aircraft art. Sept. 6, 20, 14, 1963, 20 U.S.T. 2941, 704 U.N.T.S. 219
[hereinafter Tokyo Convention].
149 See Civil Aviation Law, art. 48.
150 See Tokyo Convention, supra note 148 art. 6(2).
15, Compare Civil Aviation Law, art. 48, with id. art. 6, and Convention for the
Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air, art. 20,
Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, 137 L.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter Warsaw Convention].
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The "all necessary measures" formulation is incorporated in
the Warsaw Convention's Article 19 and can be found in Article
126 of the Chinese Civil Aviation Law, making the carrier liable
for delay unless it establishes that it took "all necessary mea-
sures."'12 In application, the criterion of reasonableness is still
applicable. In the context of Article 20 of the Warsaw Conven-
tion, which also uses the "all necessary measures" formulation,
the court in Goldman v. Thai Airways observed that the necessary
measures should be those considered necessary by the reasona-
ble man.15 3
There is an argument that the drafters of the Chinese Avia-
tion Law, in redrafting the Tokyo Convention's Article 6 as Arti-
cles 46 and 48, have lost an important part of its meaning. A
comparison with the approach taken in the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region (SAR) reveals significant differences in
drafting; Hong Kong's Aviation Security Ordinance (1996) sec-
tion 4, which opts for the Tokyo Convention wording, expressly
permits the commander of the aircraft to "take with respect to
that person such reasonable measures, including restraint
"154
In Australia, under Regulation 309 of the Civil Aviation Regu-
lations (1988), the pilot-in-command, with "such assistance as is
necessary and reasonable," may remove "a person from the air-
craft or [place] a person under restraint or in custody by
force."'5 5 This includes the power of arrest under Regulation
309(2)."6' The wording of both the Australian and the Hong
Kong provisions are closely based on the wording from Tokyo
Convention. The People's Republic of China's propensity to re-
model the wording takes away from the uniformity sought by the
international regime, especially where it tampers with the test
that applies to the aircraft commander's actions.
In the United States, incidents of air rage may result in signifi-
cant penalties with passengers potentially liable for up to
$25,000 and imprisonment for up to twenty years.'"' While su-
perficially providing a strong penal edge to the legal regime,
152 See Civil Aviation Law, art. 126.
153 Goldman v. Thai Airways, [1983] 3 All ER 693 (C.A.) (Eng.).
154 Compare Aviation Security Ordinance, No. 494, (1997) 362 O.H.K.,§ 4(2)(b) (H.K.), with Tokyo Convention, supra note 148, art. 6.
155 Civil Aviation Regulations 1988 (Cth) reg 309(1) (a) (Austl.).
156 Id. reg 309(2).
157 Bryan Robinson, Flight Attendants Say Air Rage Ignored, ABC NEWS (July 6,
2013), http://www.abcnews.go.com/US/story?id=92907&page=2.
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airline workers have argued that the penalties alone are not suf-
ficient and that the penalties need to be drawn more effectively
to the attention of passengers more effectively before they em-
bark on their journeys.1 5 8
VIII. CHINA'S AVIATION LAW
Runway incursions by passengers, assaults of gate and airline
staff, damage to property, unruly crowd behavior, and disruptive
behavior in flight all focus attention on the nature and reach of
China's aviation laws. China's aviation laws include the Regula-
tions on Security Protection in Civil Aviation, 59 Civil Aviation
Law of the People's Republic of China,16 0 the Criminal Law of
the People's Republic of China,"6 ' and the Regulations on Ad-
ministrative Penalties for Public Security.'1 2
The Civil Aviation Law of the People's Republic of China
makes pertinent references to behavior on board aircraft in
flight and disruptive behavior in airports.'6 3 Within airports, Ar-
ticle 198 provides that " [a] person who assembles a crowd to
disturb the order of a civil airport shall be investigated for his
criminal responsibility in accordance with the provisions of . . .
of the Criminal Law."' 6 4 The Criminal Law of the People's Re-
public of China provides a generic provision covering crowds in
a number of public places.' 6 5 Under it, offenders are subject to
up to five years in prison.16 6 It provides as follows:
Where an assembled crowd disturbs order at stations, wharves,
civil airports, marketplaces, public parks, theatres, cinemas, exhi-
bition halls, sports grounds or other public places, or an assem-
bled crowd blocks traffic or undermines traffic order or resists or
obstructs public security administration personnel of the state
158 See id.
159 Regulations on Security Protection in Civil Aviation (promulgated by the
State Council of the People's Republic of China, July 6, 1996, effective July 6,
1996) (Lawinfochina) (China).
160 Civil Aviation Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's
Cong., Oct. 30, 1995, effective Mar. 1, 1996) (China).
161 Criminal Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong.,
Mar. 14, 1997, effective Oct. 1, 1997) (China).
162 Regulations on Administrative Penalties for Public Security (promulgated
by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Sept. 5, 1986, effective as amended
May 12, 1994) (China).
163 Civil Aviation Law, art. 192.
164 Id. art. 198.
165 Criminal Law, art. 291.
166 Id.
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from carrying out their duties according to law, if the circum-
stances are serious, the ringleaders shall be sentenced to fixed-
term imprisonment of not more than five years, criminal deten-
tion, public surveillance or deprivation of political rights.6
Article 192 of the Chinese Civil Aviation Law prohibits the use
of force on the persons aboard a civil aircraft in flight which
imperils air safety and permits prosecution under Article 105 of
the Criminal Law.'
Article 16 of the Regulations on Security Protection in Civil
Aviation relates to conduct at an airport.169 It states a number of
express prohibitions, namely:
(1) climbing over, passing through or damaging protective
rails and other security facilities in the airport;
(2) hunting, grazing livestock, drying grain in the air or sun,
or teaching driving within the airport control areas;
(3) entering the airport control area without a pass;
(4) wantonly going across the aircraft runways or taxiing
paths;
(5) boarding or occupying aircraft by force;
(6) falsely reporting dangers to make disturbance; and
(7) committing other actions disturbing the order in the
airport. 170
Article 16(3) and 16(4) cover the situation of a tarmac invasion
while Article 16(1) and 16(7) cover incidents like the Yan
Linkun temper tantrum and its associated damage to equip-
ment.'7 1 It is arguably sufficiently broad to also encompass as-
saults against airport staff.
The rash of recent air rage incidents at airports in China
raises the issue of what law applies to disturbances in airports.
Interestingly, Article 34 of the Regulations on Security Protec-
tion in Civil Aviation prescribes that any violation of Article 14
(personnel and vehicles in the aircraft moving area and the
maintenance area), Article 16, Article 24(1), Article 24(2), and
Article 25 (including smoking, fighting, and stealing) are pun-
ishable under the Regulations on Administrative Penalties for
167 Id.
168 Civil Aviation Law, art. 192.
169 Regulations on Security Protection in Civil Aviation (promulgated by the St.
Council, July 6, 1996, effective July 6, 1996), art. 16 (Lawinfochina) (China).
170 Id.
171 Id.; Scally, supra note 47.
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Public Security.17 2 The Regulations on Administrative Penalties
for Public Security reflect an interaction between the criminal
and civil laws of China according to the seriousness of the al-
leged act by providing in Article 2 that:
Whoever disturbs social order, endangers public safety, infringes
upon a citizen's rights of the person and encroaches upon public
or private property, if such acts constitute a crime according to
the Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China, shall be in-
vestigated for criminal responsibility; if such acts are not serious
enough for criminal punishment but should be given administra-
tive penalties for public security, penalties shall be given accord-
ing to these Regulations.' 7 3
It seems that there is considerable discretion in how the law is
applied because Articles 4 and 5 of the Regulations on Adminis-
trative Penalties for Public Security-though according with a
mediated approach-seem to amount to a significant watering
down of the penal sanctions.17 4 Article 4 provides that "[i] n deal-
ing with those who violate the administration of public security,
public security organs shall adhere to the principle of combin-
ing education with punishment."1 7 5 Article 5 provides that "acts
caused by civil disputes which violate the administration of pub-
lic security, such as brawling and damaging or destroying an-
other person's property, if the adverse effects are minor, may be
handled by public security organs through mediation."' 7 6 Under
Article 6, the penalty options include (1) warning, (2) a fine
ranging from a symbolic one yuan to a maximum of 200 yuan,
or (3) detention ranging from a minimum of one day to a maxi-
mum of fifteen days.17 7 A literal application of Article 12 seems
inappropriate for civil aviation because it provides that "[a] n in-
toxicated person who may cause danger to himself or who
threatens the safety of others due to his drunken state shall be
restrained until he returns to a sober state."" Comparatively, in
172 Regulations on Security Protection in Civil Aviation, art. 34 ("reselling for
profits certificates for purchasing tickets, passenger tickets or valid certificates of
an air transport enterprises"; and (2) "booking tickets or going on board with
other's identity certificate.").
173 Regulations on Administrative Penalties for Public Security (promulgated
by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Sept. 5, 1986, effective as amended
May 12, 1994), art. 2 (China).
174 See id. arts. 4, 5.
175 Id. art. 4.
176 Id. art. 5.
177 Id. art. 6.
178 Id. art. 12.
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the United States or Australia, someone who threatens the safety
of others, in either an airport or on board an aircraft, would
likely be subject to more substantial punishment.
Where an assault or battery takes place, Article 22 of the Reg-
ulations on Administrative Penalties for Public Security comes
into play.'19 For striking another person, the perpetrator, where
not deemed serious enough for criminal punishment, "shall be
detained for a maximum of fifteen days, fined . .. or given a
warning."'80 It would seem that the soft approach of the Peo-
ple's Republic of China's regulations belongs to a past era and
that, arguably, a more rigorous approach is necessary to discour-
age inappropriate behavior.
IX. THE POSITION UNDER THE AVIATION
LIABILITY CONVENTIONS
Article 19 of the Montreal Convention, under which the air
carrier's liabilities to passengers is determined, expressly deals
with delay.1 8' It provides that " [t] he carrier is liable for damage
occasioned by delay" unless "the carrier proves that its ... agents
took all measures that could reasonably be required to avoid the
damage or that it was impossible for them to take such mea-
sures."' This obligation relates to international carriage by air,
not domestic carriage per se, unless the domestic law is closely
based on the international legal regime.'8 3
A distinction needs to be drawn here between complete non-
performance of the contract and delayed performance. Weiss v.
El Al Israel Airlines stands for the proposition that complete non-
performance of a contract does not come under the Montreal
Convention of 1999.1" If there is damage from delay, Article 22
specifies that the liability of the carrier for each passenger is
capped at 4,150 SDR.8 6
In the Canadian case of Lukacs v. United Airlines, the plaintiff
argued that the defendant had not taken all necessary measures
to avoid his delay because the carrier should have had other
17 Id. art. 22.
180 Id.
181 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage
by Air art. 19, May 28, 1999, T.I.A.S. 13038, 2242 U.N.T.S. 350 [hereinafter Mon-
treal Convention].
182 Id.
183 Id. art. 1.
184 Weiss v. El Al Israel Airlines, 433 F. Supp. 2d 361 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
185 See Montreal Convention, supra note 181, art. 22.
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flights available, and the carrier failed to timely endorse his
ticket so that he could travel on the alternate Northwest
flight."' The court held that the defendants had not established
that they had taken all measures that "could reasonably be re-
quired to avoid the damage sustained by the plaintiff arising
from delay."''8
X. THE DAMAGE PROBLEM UNDER ARTICLE 19
The Montreal Convention does not define damage, so it is left
to national law to define the term and to establish which kind of
damage must be compensated.' 8 The problem of what consti-
tutes a delay can torment courts, as it is not possible to apply a
rigid formula. Basically, that leaves the courts to consider the
facts of each case to determine whether a delay under the con-
vention occurred. Where a delay has taken place, the resultant
damage might typically involve the cost of the following items:
accommodation and transportation in the event of a missed
connecting flight; and additional expenses (e.g., the purchase of
a first class ticket) in order to reach the destination via a differ-
ent flight."8 '
XI. THE EUROPEAN UNION APPROACH TO DELAY
Compensation for denied boarding and cancellation or long
delay of flights, as previously alluded to, is provided in European
Union States under Council Regulation 261/2004.900 This regu-
lation prescribes a number of standardized measures in the
event of a canceled flight.19' For example, the passengers may
receive reimbursement of their ticket price or be rerouted.19 2
While waiting for a later flight, the air carrier is required to offer
adequate care to the passengers, which may consist of accommo-
dation, meals, and telephone calls.' 93 "Finally, where the flight is
cancelled without notice or with very short notice and there are
no extraordinary circumstances, passengers also have the right
to a flat-rate compensation, the amount of which varies depend-
186 Lukacs v. United Airlines, Inc., [2009] MBQB 29, paras. 21-22 (Can.).
187 Id. at para. 47.
188 See generally Montreal Convention, supra note 181.
189 See WARSAW CONVENTION: SUPPLEMENT 13 (Elmar Giemulla & Ronald
Schmid eds., 2000).
190 Council Regulation 261/2004, art. 5, 2004 O.J. (L 046) (EC).
19, Id.
192 Air Passenger Rights, EU Focus, Jan. 2011, at 8.
193 Id.
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ing on the distance of the scheduled flight.""' The European
Court of Justice (ECJ) has given judicial consideration to the
Regulation in the case of Sousa Rodriguez v. Air France SA in
2011.195
XII. THE MODERNIZATION OF THE
TOKYO CONVENTION
On September 14, 1963, at the International Conference on
Air Law, which convened in Tokyo, Japan, under the auspices of
ICAO, the text of the Convention on Offences and Certain
Other Acts Committed On Board Aircraft (Tokyo Convention)
was signed."'
The Tokyo Convention was established to provide a uniform
approach to deal with unlawful acts committed on board an air-
craft.1 '7 In particular, the Tokyo Convention provides a frame-
work to address "offences against penal law"' and "acts which,
whether or not they are offences, may or do jeopardize the
safety of the aircraft or of persons or property therein or which
jeopardize good order and discipline on board,"199 which have
been committed or done "on board any aircraft registered in a
[c]ontracting [s]tate, while that aircraft is in flight or on the
surface of the high seas or of any other area outside the territory
of any State." 200
What constitutes an offense under Article 1(a) varies depend-
ing on the subject state's domestic laws.2 0 1 In addition, Article 2
provides that no provision of the Convention will be interpreted
as "requiring any action in respect of offences against penal laws
of a political nature or those based on racial or religious
discrimination." 202
"The Tokyo Convention .. . entered into force on [December
4, 1969,] and [is] one of the most widely ratified international
194 Press Release, Court of Justice, Judgment in Case C-83/10 Aurora Sousa
Rodriguez v Air France SA, European Union Press Release N. 111/11 (Oct. 13,
2011).
195 Case C-38/10, Sousa v. Air France SA, 2011 E.C.R. 1.
196 Tokyo Convention, supra note 148.
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instruments ever developed under the auspices of ICAO"20 s with
185 state parties.2 0 Notwithstanding this success, following no-
ticeable increases over time in incidents of unruly passenger be-
havior, at the 34th Session of the ICAO Legal Committee in
2009, the IATA tabled a report proposing to form a Secretariat
Study Group to consider whether or not the Tokyo Convention
should be revised2 0 5 to provide redress because (1) it "does not
provide an adequate deterrent to unruly and disruptive beha-
viour on board aircraft"; (2) there are "gaps in the current text
of the Convention"; and (3) there is a need to eliminate "incon-
sistent interpretation" of its key provisions.206
At the 35th Session of the Legal Committee of the ICAO held
in Montreal in May 2013, the main item considered by the Legal
Committee was the issue of "[a]cts or offences of concern to the
international aviation community and not covered by existing
air law instruments,"20  which in layman's terms means the con-
sideration of the merits to modernize the Tokyo Convention. In
response to the draft protocol to amend the Tokyo Convention
1963, IATA undertook an analysis of unruly passenger incidents
during the period from January 2007 to June 2010.208 The
IATA's findings are contained in an ICAO working paper (LC/
35-WP/2-2) from the 35th Session of the Legal Committee held
from May 6-15, 2013.209
In pointing to a 'jurisdictional lacuna" in the Tokyo Conven-
tion, the IATA emphasized the need for modernization of the
text.21 0 The problem lies in the fact that, under the Tokyo Con-
203 Alejandro Piera, Report of the Rapparteur of the Special Sub-Committee on the Prep-
aration of an Instrument to Modernize the Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts
Committed on Board Aircraft of 1963 4 (Int'l Civil Aviation Org., Working Paper No.
LC/SC-MOT-WP/1, 2012).
204 See Current List of Parties to Multilateral Air Law Treaties, http://www.icao.int/
secretariat/legal/List%20of%20Parties/TokyoEN.pdf (last visited Nov. 7, 2014).
205 Piera, supra note 201, at 1.
206 The International Air Transport Association's Views on the Modernisation of the
Tokyo Convention 1963 and the Emerging Problem of Unruly and Disruptive Passengers
1 (Int'l Civil Aviation Org., Working Paper No. LC/SC-MOT-WP/2, 2012) [her-
ienafter IATA on the Modernisation of the Tokyo Convention].
207 Agenda Item 2: Acts or Offences of Concern to the International Aviation Commu-
nity and Not Covered by Existing Air Law Instruments 1 (Int'l Civil Aviation Org.,
Working Paper No. LC/35-WP/2-1, 2013).
208 IATA on the Modernisation of the Tokyo Convention, supra note 206, at 2.
209 See Comments of the International Air Transport Association (IATA) on LC/35-
WP/2-1 and the Legal Aspects of the Issue of Unruly Passengers 1 (Int'l Civil Aviation
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vention, jurisdiction over offenses committed on board the air-
craft is afforded to the state of registration of the aircraft.2 1"
There is no automatic prosecution by the competent authorities
at the place of landing.212 In the 1995 Hong Kong court of ap-
peal case R. v. Remy Martins Duggam, the court noted the ab-
sence of state of landing jurisdiction in the following terms: "I
express the hope that signatories to the Tokyo Convention will
be astute in seeking the extradition for prosecution of those
who commit offences aboard their registered or controlled air-
craft. Failing this, 'crime' committed aboard aircraft may go
unchecked." 21
There are examples of violent passengers being delivered to
the appropriate authorities at the place of landing only for those
authorities to conclude that the incident occurred over the high
seas, involved a national of another country, and occurred on
board an aircraft registered in another state. 214 Thus, the
prosecutory authorities at the plgace of landing conclude that
they did not have jurisdiction, and consequently, the perpetra-
tor of the violence on board the aircraft was neither detained
nor prosecuted. 215
The IATA submission notes that some states have amended
their domestic laws to provide for national courts to "exercise
. . . jurisdiction . . . over events that occur on board foreign
aircraft which land in their territory."21' The IATA submission
also notes that some states are reluctant to act in the absence of
express coverage under a treaty.217 "[I]n the absence of a
211 Id.
212 Id.; see also Margaret P. Fogg, Air Rage: Is It a Global Problem? What Proactive
Measures Can Be Taken to Reduce Air Rage, and Whether the Tokyo Convention Should
Be Amended to Ensure Prosecution of Air Rage Offenders?, 7 ILSAJ. INT'L & Comp. L.
511, 533 (2001) (noting that "[i]f the landing state chooses not to extradite or
prosecute the offender, the state must set him free and let him continue to the
destination of his choice as soon as possible."); R.I.R. Abeyratne, Attempts at Ensur-
ing Peace and Security in International Aviation, 24 TRANSP. L.J. 27, 41-42.
213 The Queen v. Remy Martins Duggam, [1995] 2 H.KC.L.R. 137, 142 (C.A.).
The court acknowledged in a majority decision that while Section 1(3) of the
Tokyo Convention provides for jurisdiction, it does not create any territorial of-
fense under the law in force in Hong Kong for a flight in which the carrier was
not Hong Kong flagged (Qantas). Although the acts that occurred on board the
aircraft would have amounted to an offense if they occurred in Hong Kong, they
were not subject to Section 17(1) of the Theft Ordinance, and consequently,
were a nullity. See id.
214 Piera, supra note 15, at 235.
215 Id.
216 Comments on the IATA Working Paper, supra note 209, at 2.
217 Id.
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mandatory [s] tate of landing jurisdiction provision, it may be
difficult to convince national legislators of the importance of
modifying their applicable domestic law."'
The IATA submission argues for "[a] mandatory [s] tate of
landing jurisdiction" and a mandatory "State of the operator"
jurisdiction.2 1 9 The "[s]tate of the operator" jurisdiction caters
to modern practice with airlines leasing around forty percent of
all aircraft in 2012.220 This is predicted to rise to around 50% by
2015.221
Interestingly, the IATA also supports further voluntary bases
of jurisdiction derived from the "nationality and habitual resi-
dence" of the operator.2 2 2 These are suggestive of jurisdictions
available under Article 33 of the Montreal Convention of 1999,
namely "the domicile of the carrier or . . . its principal place of
business. "223
The ICAO proposal also seeks to provide a clear definition of
what constitutes an offense.224 Where the Tokyo Convention
leaves this to the state taking jurisdiction, ICAO advocates a
more explicit approach.2 2 5 It suggests that police become reluc-
tant to prosecute when they are uncertain about how the behav-
ior fits in with their domestic law.226
Currently, the "[Tokyo] Convention only applies when the
aircraft is 'in flight.'" 2 27 The IATA argues for greater uniformity
with the approaches adopted in the Warsaw and Montreal Con-
ventions and the Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful
Acts Relating to International Civil Aviation Convention (Beij-
ing Convention) of 2010.228 The Beijing Convention's Article
2(a) provides that "an aircraft is considered to be in-flight at any






223 Montreal Convention, supra note 181.
224 Comments on the IATA Working Paper, supra note 209, at 2-3.
225 See id.
226 Id. at 3 (providing that "[p]olice or prosecution authorities, in practice, will
often not pursue an unruly passenger at all because they are not certain how the
conduct complained of fits into the scope of their domestic criminal law. In many
cases, authorities simply prefer to release the passenger to his or her onward
journey").
227 Id.
228 See id. at 4.
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following embarkation until the moment when any such door is
opened for disembarkation."2
When aircraft commanders find it necessary to divert and dis-
charge unruly passengers, the IATA submits that a right of re-
course needs to be provided to airlines so that they may recover
the costs of any such diversion.23 0 In this context, a proposed
Article 18 bis provides as follows: "[W]hen the aircraft com-
mander disembarks or delivers a person pursuant to the provi-
sions of Articles 8 or 9 respectively, the [o]perator shall not be
precluded from recovering from such person any damages in-
curred by the [o]perator as a result of such disembarkation or
delivery."2 3 ' In this context, it is pertinent to note that in somejurisdictions, courts make orders for unruly passengers to com-
pensate the air carrier for the cost of diversion to offload
them.2 3 2 For example, in Australia, unruly passenger Francis Ma-
caskill was fined $3,500, received a suspended sentence of four
months in jail, and ordered to pay Qantas $18,245, which repre-
sented the cost of the aircraft's diversion to Melbourne.2 3 3
The Report of the Legal Committee outlined the position of
ICAO member states, as expressed during the thirty-fifth ses-
sion, on the expansion of jurisdiction of the Tokyo Convention
as follows:
A majority of [s]tates opined that the addition of new jurisdic-
tions, in particular those of the [s] tate of the operator and of the[s]tate of landing, would strengthen the regime set up by the
Tokyo Convention. A good number of those [s]tates would fa-
vour mandatory jurisdictions so as to avoid the possibility of un-
punished acts, while others would prefer such jurisdictions to be
optional, one of them mentioning that its own statistics in fact
demonstrated a decrease of unruly behaviours in recent years. A
handful of [s]tates expressed their doubts about incorporating
such jurisdictions, as other possible non-penal avenues to deter
disruptive acts had not been sufficiently explored. One [s]tate
229 Id. at 3.
230 Id. at 4.
231 Id.
232 Air Rage Granny to Fined and Banned, N.Z. HERALD (June 6, 2012, 5:30 AM),
http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?cid=1&objectid=10811058.
233 Id. The aircraft, which was on a flight to Wellington, New Zealand, was di-
verted back to Melbourne to off-load Macaskill, who was in a drunken state, be-
haved in a disorderly manner, and had punched another passenger. Id.
732
2014] AIR RAGE AND THE TOKYO CONVENTION
also raised the issue of addressing the matter of concurrent juris-
dictions if additional jurisdictions were to be established.23 4
A. BACKGROUND OF THE PROTOCOL To AMEND THE
CONVENTION ON OFFENSES AND CERTAIN OTHER ACTS
COMMITTED ON BOARD AIRCRAFT (TOKYO
CONVENTION PROTOCOL)
The Diplomatic Conference to Consider Amending the To-
kyo Convention of 1963 took place between March 26 and April
4, 2014.6 Because its Legal Bureau oversees the development
of drafts for new treaties and the amendment of existing trea-
ties, the ICAO occupies center stage when it comes to interna-
tional lawmaking as a response to the air rage phenomenon.23 6
The ICAO Legal Committee saw fit in its thirty-fifth session to
include the "in-flight security officer" (IFSO) in its Option 1 ver-
sion of Article 6, essentially conferring the powers provided to
the aircraft commander also to the IFSO.2 "' This was a very de-
liberate decision to include the IFSO in the convention. The
Friends of the Chair Working Group on IFSOS included in Ap-
pendix F of the Report of the 35th Session of the ICAO Legal
Committee an outline stating that one of the purposes of this
inclusion is "to align the power of the IFSO with the aircraft
commander." 238
The definition of IFSO proposed to be added to the Tokyo
Convention was included in Appendix F of the thirty-fifth ses-
sion with further options read as follows:
(b) "in-flight security officer" means a [government employee]/
[person] who is specially selected, trained and authorized by
the government of the [s]tate of the operator [and]/[or]
the government of the [s]tate of registration to be deployed
on an aircraft, pursuant to a bilateral or multilateral [agree-
ment (and/or) arrangement], with the purpose of
(Option A) protecting that aircraft and its occupants against
acts of unlawful interference [ ].
234 ICAO, Report of the 35th Session of the Legal Committee, at 2-1, ICAO Doc.
10014-LC/35 (May 6-15, 2013) [hereinafter ICAO Legal Committee Report].
235 See EventInformation: International Conference on Air Law - Diplomatic Confer-
ence to Consider Amending the Tokyo Convention of 1963, http://www.icao.int/Meet
ings/AirLaw/_Iayouts/mobile/dispform.aspx?List=e610dc34-46ce-47eb-bd75-73e
62958c428&View=0bcf5894-ec9a-4cO7-8a60-bc685434d8a5&ID=1 (last visited Nov.
13, 2014).
236 ICAO Legal Committee Report, supra note 234, at 1.
237 Id. at F-2.
238 Id. at F-1.
733
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AMD COMMERCE
(Option B) protecting that aircraft and its occupants against
any offence or act contemplated in Article 1 paragraph 1.
(Option C) protecting the safety of that aircraft, or of persons
or property on board.23 9
The IATA submissions cited several cases, including the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit case, Eid v. Alaska Air-
lines, which indicated that the issue of the reasonableness of the
aircraft commander's actions fell within the purview of the
court.24 0 In the case, during a flight from Vancouver, Canada to
Las Vegas, United States, a report from a flight attendant to the
effect that she had "lost control of the first-class cabin"
prompted a diversionary landing in Reno. 2 1' Eid was the first
U.S. case to interpret the application of the Tokyo Conven-
tion.24 2 In that case, the 2-1 majority opinion cites the U.S. dele-
gate to the Tokyo Diplomatic Conference, which observed that:
Within the general concept of United States law, the phrase "rea-
sonable grounds" would give the impression that the aircraft
commander would be required to have a substantial basis for his
belief, that he could not act on the basis of facts which were inad-
equate to support his belief to the effect that a person had com-
mitted or was about to commit the kind of act under
consideration. 243
The court noted with interest that the then-President of the
United States, President Johnson, emphasized in his message to
the Senate the relevance of the reasonableness criterion as a
measure of the commander's conduct.24 4 The court concluded
that "viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
plaintiffs, a fact finder here could conclude that Captain Swani-
gan did not have reasonable grounds to believe that plaintiffs
posed a threat to the security or order of the aircraft." 2 5 The
pilot, upon being informed by a member of the cabin crew that
she had lost control of the first-class cabin, had neither asked
questions nor looked into the cabin through the cockpit win-
dow. 24 6 The IATA submission, acknowledging that there is some
239 Id. at F-4.
24 See Comments on the IATA Working Paper, supra note 209, at 5 (citing Eid v.
Alaska Airlines, Inc., 621 F. 3d 858 (9th Cir. 2010).
241 Eid, F.3d at 862-64.
242 Id. at 866.
243 Id. at 867.
244 See id.
245 Id. at 869.
246 See id.
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divergence in the case law, asserted "that the commander is in
an imperfect position to assess conditions in the passenger cabin
from behind the cockpit door."24 7 The IATA argued for an
amendment of Article 10 of the Tokyo Convention to assess the
commander's actions "in light of the facts and circumstances ...
known to him or her at the time that those actions were
taken."248
The irony of Eid is that its facts provide a good argument for
pilots personally investigating instances of passenger miscon-
duct. On the other hand, the very act of leaving the security of
the cockpit may have negative implications for the safety of the
aircraft. As observed some years ago by Captain Stephen Luckey
of the Airline Pilots Association (ALPA):
With two-pilot cockpit aircraft in widespread and growing use to-
day [,] ... sending a pilot into the passenger cabin to help resolve
a dispute seriously diminishes the safety of flight. This is particu-
larly so in the event of an altercation, which could [potentially]
result in an incapacitated pilot and a resulting one-pilot
aircraft.249
Alaska Airlines' petition for certiorari was denied by the U.S.
Supreme Court on May 2, 2011, notwithstanding the amicus
briefs filed in support by airline associations (the Transport As-
sociation of America and IATA), pilot associations (ALPA and
International Federation of Air Line Pilots Association), and
eminent international aviation law academics, including Profes-
sor Paul Dempsey, the Director of the Institute of Air and Space
Law and Tomlinson Professor of Law in Global Governance in
Air and Space Law at McGill University, and Professor Pablo
Mendes de Leon, the Director of the International Institute of
Air and Space Law at the University of Leiden, The Netherlands,
and President of the European Air Law Association .2 " This was
an opportunity lost for ascertaining a definitive interpretation of
the rights and obligations of the relevant actors under the terms
247 Comments on the IATA Working Paper, supra note 209, at 6.
248 Id. at 6.
29 Passenger Interference with Flight Crews and the Carry-on Baggage Reduction Act of
1997: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Aviation Comm. on Transp. & Infrastructure
(1998) (statement of Captain Stephen Luckey, Chairman, Nat'l Sec. Comm., Air-
line Pilots Ass'n).
250 See Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Eid, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/
case-files/cases/alaska-airlines-inc-v-eid (last visited Nov. 7, 2014), to view the U.S.
Court of Appeals decision, the petition for certiorari, all amicus briefs, and the
brief in opposition.
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of the Tokyo Convention by the highest court in the United
States.
B. THE CONTENT OF THE NEW PROTOCOL
In a press release at the conclusion of the Diplomatic Confer-
ence, the ICAO Council President, Dr. Olumuyiwa Benard Aliu,
drew attention to two of the most significant initiatives embed-
ded in the new Protocol.5 ' These are recommended by both
the ICAO and IATA as follows: (1) the recognition of the role of
the IFSO and (2) the expansion of state jurisdiction over of-
fenses to include both the state of the operator and the state of
landing.252
Interestingly, the method adopted by the Conference is for
the Protocol to be expressed as amendments to or replacements
of particular provisions of the Tokyo Convention.25 ' To facilitate
this process, the Conference adopted a consolidated text of the
Tokyo Convention as amended by the new Protocol.5
Some of the more notable amendments of the Tokyo Conven-
tion included the following:
An alignment of the Tokyo Convention with the Beijing Con-
vention's definition of "in flight" is made under Article 2 of the
Protocol, which amends the Tokyo Convention definition in Ar-
ticle 1, paragraph 3.255 As with the Beijing Convention, the air-
craft is considered to be "in flight .. . from the moment when all
its external doors are closed."2 5 6 The prior position under the
Tokyo Convention was that an aircraft was not in flight until
"power [was] applied for the purpose of take-off."25 7 Equally, the
flight would end at the "moment when the landing run ends."258
251 See Press Release, Int'l Civil Aviation Org., ICAO Diplomatic Conference
Delivers New Protocol Addressing Disruptive Passengers (Apr. 7, 2014), available
at http://www.icao.int/Newsroom/Pages/ICAO-Diplomatic-Conference-delivers-
new-Protocol-addressing-disruptive-passengers.aspx [hereinafter ICAO Press
Release].
252 Id.
253 See ICAO, Draft Final Act of the International Conference on Air Law Diplomatic
Conference to Consider Amending the Tokyo Convention of 1963, DCTC Doc. No. 35
(2014).
254 See id.
255 ICAO, Protocol to Amend the Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Com-
mitted on Board Aircraft, at 2, DCTC Doc. No. 34 (2014) [hereinafter ICAO
Protocol].
256 Id.
257 Tokyo Convention, supra note 148, 704 U.N.T.S. at 222.
258 Id.
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Hence, under the new formulation, the convention remains ap-
plicable to the period after the doors are closed but before the
power is applied; upon landing, the period while taxiing to the
jet bridge, and before the external doors are open for
disembarkation."
Article 2 of the Protocol also solves any problems that may
potentially occur if the state of the operator is different from the
state of registration. It does so by declaring that "the term 'the
State of registration', as used in Articles 4, 5, and 13 of the To-
kyo Convention shall be deemed to be the State of the
operator. "260
The Protocol, as flagged by the President of ICAO's Council,
reshapes the Tokyo Convention's jurisdictional provisions. 261
The methodology of the Tokyo Convention was to provide for a
flag-state jurisdiction (the state of registration of the aircraft)
over criminal offenses committed on board under Article 3 with
some exceptions. 6 Those exceptions were outlined in Article
4.263 In the consolidated text of the Convention, Article 4 is left
intact, leaving the contracting states with exceptions in the fol-
lowing cases:
a) the offence has effect on the territory of such State;
b) the offence has been committed by or against a national or
permanent resident of such State;
c) the offence is against the security of such State;
d) the offence consists of a breach of any rules or regulations
relating to the flight or manoeuvre of aircraft in force in such
State; [and]
e) the exercise of jurisdiction is necessary to ensure the obser-
vance of any obligation of such State under a multilateral in-
ternational agreement.264
However, as previously alluded to, the Protocol adds an im-
portant primary jurisdictional option: the State of landing. This
is provided for under an expanded Article 3 of the consolidated
text by virtue of the Protocol's Article 4 replacing the prior Arti-
259 See ICAO Protocol, supra note 255, at 2.
260 Id.
261 ICAO Press Release, supra note 251.
262 Tokyo Convention, supra note 148, 704 U.N.T.S. at 222-24.
263 Id. at 224.
264 ICAO, Consolidated Text of the Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts
Committed on Board Aircraft (Tokyo, 1963) and the Protocol to Amend the Convention on
Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft (Montreal, 2014), at 3,
DCTC Doc. No. 33 (2014) [hereinafter Consolidated Text].
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cle 3 in full.265 The inclusion of the State of landing jurisdiction,
along with the state of the operator jurisdiction, was not without
resistance from certain states. 66 In particular, early in the con-
ference, Germany outlined a range of objections.2 6 7 Among
other arguments, Germany suggested that:
The State of landing and the State of the operator do not appear
to be more effective in terms of dealing with the typical cases of
unruly behaviour than the State of registration. This is because of
the probably very large number of cases of unruly behaviour
where the crew, the offender and the witnesses live in different
countries and also not necessarily in the State of landing.268
Germany further argued on practical grounds that the newjuris-
diction would lead to additional problems and expenses, such as
(1) expenses associated with legal assistance translations and (2)
the obligation on the part of crew to miss connecting flights in
order to remain available to give testimony.26 9
Significantly, a further option is preserved in the original
text's Article 7(1) (c) where, although the aircraft lands at, for
example, an agreed stopping place, the person under restraint
may agree "to onward carriage under restraint."2 7 o Perhaps
there are indeed some prison systems to be avoided.
C. THE IN-FLIGHT SECURITY OFFICER
A major initiative of the new Protocol is the inclusion of the
IFSO, the in-flight security officer, within the protection of the
convention. The Protocol's Article 7 replaces the old Article 6,
which iterates the powers of the aircraft commander.2 7 1 Article 6
now includes paragraphs 2, 3, and 4, which extend to the air-
craft commander the power to "request or authorize, but not
require, the assistance of in-flight security officers or passengers
to restrain any person whom he is entitled to restrain."27 2 The
criterion of reasonableness continues to apply to such actions.
However, if under Article 6(3) the IFSO is "deployed pursuant
265 See ICAO Protocol, supra note 255, at 3.
266 See, e.g., ICAO, Proposal for Amendments to the Reference Text (Presented by Ger-




270 Tokyo Convention, supra note 148, 704 U.N.T.S. at 226-28.
271 See ICAO Protocol, supra note 255, at 4.
272 Id.
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to a bilateral or multilateral agreement or arrangement between
the relevant Contracting States," the IFSO ,
may take reasonable preventive measures without such authoriza-
tion when he has reasonable grounds to believe that such action
is immediately necessary to protect the safety of the aircraft or
persons therein from an act of unlawful interference, and, if the
agreement or arrangement so allows, from the commission of se-
rious offences.273
Conversely, Article 6(3) provides that there is no obligation for
a state party to establish an IFSO program or to agree for such
arrangements to operate in that state.2 7' The final wording of
this provision is likely a direct consequence of the significant
support for the incorporation of the IFSO, and at the same
time, the significant opposition to the inclusion of protection
for this role.
Japan, in support of the inclusion of the IFSO in the new Pro-
tocol to amend the Tokyo Convention, maintained that:
The principal mission of the in-flight security officers (hereafter
"IFSOs") is to prevent or otherwise cope with serious offences
such as terrorism including hijacking, which may jeopardize the
safety of persons on board the aircraft. This is in fact the scope of
mission for IFSOs in most States deploying them, pursuant to a
bilateral or multilateral agreement or arrangement, includingJa-
pan, and this limited scope should be maintained.2 7 5
The Latin American Association of Aeronautical and Space
Law (ALADA) argued that the presence of the IFSO was justi-
fied by the increase in cases of "undisciplined passengers" who
posed a serious risk to security on flights.2 7 ' Its submission refer-
enced that incidents can arise quickly and outside the purview
of the aircraft commander, and even the crew at times.2 7 7 It ar-
gued that the speed of action of the IFSO in these circumstances
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that such a figure is not new in the international regulations of
civil aeronautics, as it was incorporated in Annex 17 of the Chi-
cago Convention. Consequently, if it was adequate for the pur-
pose of such Annex, it would be contradictory not to adopt it in
this new Protocol because it is a matter directly related to security
and proper prevention.2 7 9
The support and ultimate inclusion of the IFSO was not with-
out levels of dissent among conference delegations. In a submis-
sion to the conference, Qatar argued in favor of leaving the
IFSO issue to a bilateral agreement between states rather than
specifically including recognition of the IFSO in the new
Protocol.so
D. THE INTERRELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ARTICLES 6 AND 10 IN
THE CONSOLIDATED TEXT
The new Article 6 wording in the consolidated text provides
the aircraft commander with a range of powers if he has "rea-
sonable grounds to believe that a person has committed, or is
about to commit, . . . an offence." 8 1 Under this provision, the
aircraft commander can take reasonable measures, such as re-
straint.2 2 In doing so, the commander may also authorize the
assistance of crew members or even request and authorize, but
not require, the IFSO to restrain a passenger.28 Where there is
a bilateral or multilateral agreement that authorizes the deploy-
ment of the IFSO, he or she may also exercise powers similar to
the commander and act to restrain individuals based on his or
her reasonable belief.284 While a court may consider the legiti-
macy of the action taken,8 the new Article 10 now contains
immunity from prosecution for the commander, crew, or IFSO
with respect to their treatment of the restrained individual.2 8 1 It
now reads as follows:
For actions taken in accordance with this Convention, neither
the aircraft commander, any other member of the crew, any pas-
senger, any in-flight security officer, the owner or operator of the
279 Id.
280 See ICAO, Comments and Observations on the Draft Proposed Text of the Tokyo
Protocol of 1963 (Presented by Qatar), at 1, DCTC Doc. No. 12 (2013).
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aircraft, nor the person on whose behalf the flight was performed
shall be held responsible in any proceeding on account of the
treatment undergone by the person against whom the actions
were taken.2 17
This text was provided to the conference by the Friends of the
Chair working group toward the end of the conference and was
likely the result of heavy lobbying and intense negotiation be-
tween states in favor of and those opposed to this innovation.2 8 8
The views of states and organizations in favor of this extra layer
of protection are captured in Conference Document 15, which
was presented by the United Arab Emirates, the IATA, the Inter-
national Federation of Air Line Pilots' Associations (IFALPA),
and the International Union of Aerospace Insurers (IUAI)."2
They argued collectively that "protection from legal proceedings
for the airline and its employees under Article 10 is critical if
crews are to have the confidence to deal with any challenge to
safety and security on board an aircraft."29 0 As a counterpoint, it
is worth noting that the Convention also referenced the con-
cerns of some states that once delivered up, contracting states
"have regard for due process and fair treatment" of the offend-
ing individuals."'
It is noteworthy that the Protocol does not extend immunity
to passengers acting to restrain individuals. In the past, there
have been incidents where collective action by passengers has
resulted in the death of the offending individual.2 9 2 In the
287 Id.
288 ICAO, Report of the Friends of the Chair on In-Flight Security Officer Provisions, at
1, DCTC Doc. No. 31 (2013).
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290 Id. at 2.
291 Consolidated Text, supra note 264, at 8.
292 A 1998 incident involved Mikaeinar Peterson, a Finnish national, travelling
on a Malov Airlines flight between Bangkok and Budapest. Peterson had harassed
passengers, punched a pilot, and tried to choke a flight attendant. When crew
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United States, § 44903 of the Aviation and Transport Security
Act provides immunity to passengers acting under a reasonable
belief to thwart an act of criminal violence or piracy.9
Another significant addition to the Tokyo Convention comes
in the form of Article 15 bis, which has been inserted to add
clarity to the type of offenses against crew that fall within the
scope of the Convention. 29 4 This article encourages states "to
take such measures as may be necessary to initiate appropriate
criminal, administrative or other forms of legal proceedings
against any person who commits . . . an offence" on board.2 95
Article 15 bis, specifically in (1) (a) and 1(b), references "a)
physical assault or a threat to commit such assault against a crew
member; or b) refusal to follow a lawful instruction given by or
on behalf of the aircraft commander for the purpose of protect-
ing the safety of the aircraft or of persons or property
therein. "296 Article 18 bis, which was inserted into the Tokyo
Convention by the Protocol's Article 13, preserves the right of
the airline "to seek recovery [of damages,] under national law,
... from a person disembarked or delivered pursuant to Article
8 or 9 respectively."297
E. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE NEW PROTOCOL
Several states at the Diplomatic Conference were critical of
the softening of the impact of Article 15 bis for using the word
"encouraged" in its text.29 8 Argentina, for example, argued that
the text of Article 15 bis "should be modified so that it contains a
mandatory provision."29 9 This tends to suggest that, despite the
significant extent of the problem, states are reluctant to submit
themselves to mandatory law-making requirements. The authors
acknowledge this view, which in itself suggests the unending de-
bate about the need to mandate extradition, but at the same
time feel that the provision serves to emphasize the need for
against those involved. See Unruly Passenger Killed by Others on Fight, Report Says,
CHI. TRIB. (Sept. 17, 2000), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2000-09-17/
news/0009170277_1_passengers-burton-flight.
293 Aviation and Transportation Security Act, 49 U.S.C. § 44903(k) (2012).
294 See Consolidated Text, supra note 264, at 7.
295 Id.
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298 See, e.g., ICAO, Diplomatic Conference to Adopt the Proposed Draft Text of the Proto-
col to the Tokyo Convention of 1963 (Presented by Argentina), DCTC Doc. No. 25
(2014).
299 See id. at 5.
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legal protection of air crew through the creation of specific of-
fenses under each state's national laws.
A suggestion, alluded to earlier in this article by Piera, that
one aspect of modernizing the Tokyo Convention was to include
Circular 288 as part of the Convention, has to some extent been
taken up by the Diplomatic Conference, which refers to Circular
288 in the Final Act of the Conference as a resolution. 0 0 The
resolution is entitled "Relating to Updating Circular 288-Gui-
dance Material on the Legal Aspects of Unruly/Disruptive
Passengers. "301
Piera suggested that one way to modernize the Tokyo Conven-
tion could be to include Circular 288 into the terms of the To-
kyo Convention so that the Circular 288 has more effect than
being just "guiding material."o3 2 Noting the importance of states
enacting a full range of offenses and that the Protocol does not
attempt to do so, the Diplomatic Conference in this resolution
urged the ICAO to include in Circular 288 "a more detailed list
of offences . . . as well as to make consequential changes to
ICAO Circular 288 arising from the adoption of the Protocol to
Amend the Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed
on Board Aircraft."sos The Resolution further invited "all Member
States to include in their national laws and regulations . .. ele-
ments of the updated Circular."3 o1 While some commentators
may see this as a relatively soft option, states that take on the
creation of a full range of offenses will facilitate the effectiveness
of the other steps taken in the Protocol. In particular, the inclu-
sion of the state of landing as a jurisdictional option, when cou-
pled with a clearly defined comprehensive range of offenses, will
lead to the development of stable law and give states an impetus
to deal properly with offenders delivered into custody at the air-
craft's place of landing.
Given the onerous duties already resting on the shoulders of
the aircraft commander, the inclusion of the IFSO within the
regime, although not as a compulsory element, is another ad-
vancement and achievement of the Protocol.
300 See ICAO, Final Act of the International Conference on Air Law Diplomatic Confer-
ence to Consider Amending the Tokyo Convention of 1963, DCTC Doc. No. 36 (2014)
[hereinafter Final Act].
301 See id.
302 See Piera, supra note 15, at 241-42.
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Hopefully, history will prove that the new Protocol represents
a valuable contribution to dealing with problems that require all
parties to work together to effect change. The contribution of
the IATA, through its guidance documents and through the
many submissions made to the Diplomatic Conference, shows
that it undertook a valuable leadership role. At the same time,
its constituent membership needs to take up the issue of alcohol
consumption on board aircraft and needs to further argue for
amendment of existing laws or for the IATA carriers simply to
unilaterally agree to severely limit the availability of alcohol on
board their aircraft. In the views of the authors, the IATA needs
to persist in pushing for an industry-wide resolution to this prob-
lem. Although there is hope that individual states may act to
prohibit or limit the availability of alcohol, it is realistically
doubtful that the political will to do so exists. This is especially
true where legislatures see alcohol licensing and taxes on con-
sumption as a valuable revenue stream.
XIII. GENERAL CONCLUDING COMMENTS
In order to deal with systemic problems similar to those ex-
perienced in China (although not as severe), the United States
introduced the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012
under the Obama administration. 0 Empowered by this Act, the
Department of Transporation required carriers to implement a
contingency plan for lengthy tarmac delays.o6 A feature of the
approach that was adopted is that passengers are to be deplaned
within four hours, unless the delay is due to a safety-related or
security-related reason.o7 It also required passengers to be pro-
vided food and water within two hours, to be notified regarding
the status of the delay, and to receive updates every thirty min-
utes. 08 In an ideal world, this would provide a model for China
to follow in devising its own laws, regulations, and policies. How-
ever, the fact that delays in China are wedded to the military's
preemption of control and use of air space means that China
really needs to undertake a fundamental reevaluation of how it
handles and allocates air space between military and civilian
uses. The authors of this article understand that China is consid-
3o5 FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95, 126 Stat.
11 (to be codified at 49 U.S.C. § 44701).
306 See 14 C.F.R. § 259.4(a) (2014).
307 See id. § 259.4(b).
30 See id.
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ering introducing this kind of law, in part, to exert pressure on
the military to forego some of its eighty percent occupancy of all
airspace in order to assist civil aviation in its quest to reduce the
lengthy delays that clog the system. The writers sympathize with
the position of the government of the People's Republic of
China in dealing with an intransigent military apparatus. Re-
forms to the aviation laws of China are first predicated upon
dealing with the issue of allocation of air space. The price of
doing business in China should not be chronic delays in aircraft
arrivals and departures. China's civil society deserves better than
to be subject to chronic, systemic, and lengthy delays. Equally, at
an international level, it needs to be recognized both inside and
outside China that what happens in China no longer has an ef-
fect only in China.
More generally, there is a need in China to deal with inci-
dents where air carriers' staff and the airports' gate and counter
staff are subject to assaults. The Yan Linkun incident raises is-
sues that go beyond the ordinary due to his status as holder of a
political position in China.
The authors acknowledge that a lack of education about the
laws and rules applicable to the passenger is not purely a Chi-
nese phenomenon. Criticism in the United States concerning
the lack of knowledge of the applicable laws to carriage by air on
the part of the flying public suggests more broadly that there is a
need to educate the flying public. In China's case, the country is
well-placed to educate the public through all forms of media. It
is also well-placed to take decisive action to actually enforce the
existing law.
Overall, the future for the Protocol looks positive. First, its
long term success will likely be measured by the number of
states that become parties to the Protocol. Second, the propen-
sity of states to enact appropriate laws will be pivotal as will the
willingness of states to take jurisdiction over incidents as the
State of landing. To date, its future looks bright with twenty-six
states signing the Protocol, 0 eighty-six states signing the Final
Act,"'o and many states (not including the United States) indi-
cating support for the Protocol in their concluding remarks."'
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